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This research investigates the effects of refraining from a purchase temptation at one point in time on choices made at a subsequent opportunity
to purchase or consume a tempting product. Four experiments involving scenarios and real decisions demonstrate that the salience of restraint at a
prior impulse buying opportunity causes consumers to reward themselves subsequently by choosing indulgence over non-indulgence. We show
that indulgence is likely to increase only when prior restraint is salient and hence can be used as a justification. As expected, an index of reasons
for vs. against buying mediates the relationship between prior impulse purchase decision and indulgent choice. In further support of the
mechanism, we find that prior indulgence can have the same effect as prior restraint, if the prior indulgence is made justifiable. Finally, we show
that prior shopping restraint can increase indulgence without a corresponding increase in self-esteem. These findings extend our understanding of
self-regulation and demonstrate that everyday consumer decisions such as responses to impulse buying opportunities can have consequential
downstream effects.
© 2009 Society for Consumer Psychology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Consumers often have to make a series of purchase
decisions in the face of temptations. For example, consumers
make multiple, sequential purchase decisions when shopping
from catalogs and websites. These decisions include whether
to give in to a temptation and purchase products in categories
that they had not intended to, or whether to hold back and stick
to the shopping list. In the world of brick-and-mortar,
consumers may splurge on some books at a bookstore in a
mall and then have to make a decision on what snack to eat at
the food court. Despite the ubiquity of such moment-to-
moment activity, extant research on purchasing behavior has
concentrated on one-time brand choice and purchase quantity
decisions, often in situations where purchases are intended.
However, decisions made at one point in time, even if
seemingly irrelevant, may carry over to influence subsequent
decisions. Consumer researchers have only recently begun to☆ This article is based on the first author's doctoral dissertation at Columbia
University, supervised by the second author.
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doi:10.1016/j.jcps.2009.02.016examine such sequences of decisions (Dhar, Huber, & Khan,
2007; Dholakia, Gopinath, & Bagozzi, 2005; Mukhopadhyay,
Sengupta & Ramanathan, 2008). This research adds to this
literature by investigating the effects of refraining from a
purchase temptation on decisions to purchase or consume a
different tempting product at a subsequent opportunity.
Temptations have been formally defined as “momentary
allurements” that threaten a currently active goal (Fishbach,
Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003). In a purchasing context, this
implicates situations of impulse buying (Stern, 1962) where
consumers do not have a goal of purchasing a specific product
but may well have an overarching goal of wealth maintenance
(Hirschman, 1990; Wärneryd, 1999). Our main hypothesis is
that a salient memory of restraint in the face of such temptation
sanctions consumers to reward themselves when a subsequent
temptation presents itself. We review the literature and derive
our hypotheses below.
Theoretical framework
We propose that consumers who refrain from an impulse
purchase at a point in time are more likely to make an indulgented by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
335A. Mukhopadhyay, G.V. Johar / Journal of Consumer Psychology 19 (2009) 334–345choice at a later point in time, provided the prior shopping
restraint is made salient. Moreover, we propose that this is
because salience of prior restraint allows consumers to justify
their indulgence (e.g., “I deserve to treat myself because I




Prior literature has validated the importance of justification
on choice and has shown that people are more likely to make
a choice or draw a conclusion that can be easily justified
(e.g., Shafir, 1993; Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993;
Tetlock and Boettger, 1989). Indeed, much research has
implicated a justification mechanism as that underlying
indulgence (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005; Kivetz & Simonson,
2002; Kivetz & Zheng, 2006). Kivetz and Simonson (2002)
tested the proposition that increasing the effort required in a
loyalty program made consumers more likely to choose a
luxury rather than a necessity as a reward. Participants
preferred a luxury reward (e.g., a massage) over a utilitarian
reward (e.g., credit toward grocery purchases) of equal value
when program requirements were high (vs. low) but only if
the program was work-related. The authors conclude from
these and other results—such as the finding that preference
for luxuries is greater among consumers who are more likely
to feel guilt about indulgence—that effort helps justify the
guilt associated with choosing indulgences vs. necessities.
The notion that the likelihood of indulgence can be increased
if the guilt associated with indulgence is decreased is also
found in the work of Strahilevitz and Myers (1998) who
demonstrated that charity incentives are more effective in
promoting luxury, rather than necessity, products. Luxury
consumption is presumed to evoke guilt whereas donation to
charity is likely to reduce guilt. Mick and Faure (1998) also
propose a similar justification-based account for self-gifting
based on the finding that participants are more willing to self-
gift when they have recently experienced success and attribute
this success to themselves.
Other work on windfall gains (Arkes et al., 1994) supports
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Fig. 1. Conceptuajustification cue (O'Curry 1999). O'Curry and Strahilevitz
(2001) suggest that acquiring a hedonic good (a windfall gain)
is likely to evoke less guilt than spending income on this good
and show that hedonic options are more likely to be chosen as a
lottery prize than as a purchase option. Presumably, norms
concerning disposal of windfall gains provide a justification for
indulgence in this context. Fishbach and Dhar (2005) provide a
goal-based account for indulgence where perceptions of goal
progress liberate individuals to pursue inconsistent goals. For
example, perceptions of progress toward academic goals
allowed people to choose to hang out with friends and
anticipated progress toward a fitness goal increased likelihood
of indulgence in tasty yet fatty food. Finally, Louro, Pieters, and
Zeelenberg (2007) show that perceived goal progress liberates
people to pursue alternative goals, but only when the focal goal
is close. Again, progress towards a goal, as exemplified by
shopping restraint given a goal of not spending money, can help
justify subsequent deviation such as self-reward.
Shopping restraint
In sum, prior research has demonstrated that justifiability has
a robust effect on preference and choice. This study goes
further, by showing that shopping restraint itself can act as a
justification to make a subsequent indulgent choice. Further, the
existing literature on justification-based choice has examined
choices in general, and this paper extends this literature by
focusing on determinants of a specific type of choice—namely,
an indulgent choice.
Most people have a goal of not spending money unnecessa-
rily (Hirschman, 1990; Wärneryd, 1999). In an unplanned
shopping situation, an impulsive decision to buy goes against
this generally salient goal. In contrast, not succumbing to an
impulse buying temptation can be viewed as goal progress. In
such a case, as Louro et al. (2007) propose, prior shopping
restraint can justify subsequent indulgence. Support for this
proposition also comes from Mick and DeMoss (1990) who
found that respondents who rewarded themselves with an
indulgence did so because they thought they “deserved” it. In
their qualitative research, consumers reported feeling “proud”
and “satisfied” before the acquisition of the self-gift and
reported feeling “in control.” This suggests that the act of
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ability to justify the indulgence.
Salience of prior restraint
The fact that this proposed mechanism is a conscious one has
important implications. First and foremost, it requires that the
consumer make a connection between the shopping restraint
and the subsequent indulgent choice. In other words, we predict
that the above process will only occur if the two choices are
bracketed together. Bracketing of the two episodes ensures that
the time 1 decision and its attendant cognitions are cued again at
time 2. As Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin (1999) discuss,
choices may be bracketed temporally, physically, or relationally
(with T2 cueing T1 in some way). In our context, this implies
that the T2 indulgent choice need not follow immediately after
the T1 shopping restraint. Indeed, all that our model requires is
that the T1 decision be salient. Therefore, as an important
corollary, we predict that salience of the prior restraint will
moderate the effect of restraint on indulgence.
Alternate processes
Besides the justification-based account elucidated above, an
independent explanation proposed in the literature for the
relationship between virtuous choice at T1 and indulgent choice
at T2 is that the virtuous choice boosts self-esteem, which
makes indulgent choice more likely. Recently Khan and Dhar
(2006) have argued that altruistic acts liberate people to behave
indulgently. They suggest that the mechanism underlying this
effect is a boost in self-concept. In support of the proposed
mechanism, Khan and Dhar (2006) show that “license
condition” participants who think of performing an altruistic
task (choosing a charity to volunteer at) are more likely than
control participants to rate themselves more positively on
dimensions such compassion and warmth. These self-assess-
ments in turn mediate the relationship between licensing
behavior and self-reward. These authors also show that the
licensing effect does not occur if the licensing behavior is
attributed to external causes, suggesting that the self has to be
implicated in choosing the licensing behavior in order for the
effect to obtain. The authors interpret these effects as evidence
of a boost in self-concept mediating the effect of time 1 behavior
on time 2 choice and argue that this effect occurs below
conscious awareness.
This conceptualization is similar to that of Monin and
Miller (2001) who showed that establishing credentials as a
non-prejudiced person allows people to express attitudes that
could be viewed as prejudiced. A typical study concerns the
choice of a minority candidate for a job, followed by the
preference for a negatively stereotyped applicant. Self-
signaling of non-prejudice occurs even when it is not
warranted, such as when the minority candidate was indeed
the best qualified candidate for the job. These authors also
implicate affirmation of one's self-image (as a non-prejudiced
person) to oneself as a mechanism by which these prejudice-
sanctioning effects occur. These effects also appear to operate
below conscious awareness.It is important to note that theories of cognitive dissonance
cannot account for these propositions. Dissonance reduction
processes would predict that the behavior at time 2 would be the
same as that at time 1. This is because regardless of the behavior
at time 1, attitudes would be revised in line with the behavior
thereby ensuring consistency. Other streams of literature also
contradict our proposition that shopping restraint at T1 can
increase indulgence at T2. For example, the shopping
momentum effect (Dhar et al., 2007) suggests that an initial
act of restraint leads to more restraint later on. In contrast, we
argue that if memory of prior restraint is salient, consumers may
indulge themselves through a reasoned process of self-reward.
Summary and hypotheses
Impulse purchases are a common marketing situation where
the decision made to buy or refrain from buying could have
implications for future indulgence. In an unplanned shopping
situation, not succumbing to temptation represents goal
progress, and can therefore justify indulgence. Such indulgence
can take the form of choosing to purchase or consume hedonic
products or “vices” (as opposed to utilitarian products or
“virtues”). In general, purchase or consumption of vices is
harder to justify than that of virtues (Okada, 2005) and
provision of an external justification (such as prior restraint)
should increase the likelihood of indulging in vices (but should
not affect virtues). Therefore, we predict that consumers are
more likely to make an indulgent purchase when prior restraint
from (vs. giving in to) an indulgent purchase is salient.
Four experiments test this hypothesis in different ways.
Experiments 1 and 2 directly test it by showing that choices of
indulgence are greater for prior no-buy than for prior buy
decisions, and this effect obtains only when past shopping
restraint is salient. Experiment 3 further tests the underlying
justification process by showing that the effects can be reversed
such that prior indulgence can lead to greater indulgence at time
2 if prior indulgence is framed as virtuous and hence provides
justification for time 2 indulgence. Experiment 4 simulta-
neously investigates the justification and self-esteem based
processes presumed to underlie indulgence.
Our contribution is four-fold. First, we broaden the study of
self-rewards in marketing contexts from specific situations such
as loyalty programs and charity donations to the more
generalized context of unplanned buying opportunities—a
situation that most consumers face multiple times every day.
Second, we bring together existing work that implicates self-
concepts and justifications in self-reward, by showing how both
processes may independently have the effect of instigating self-
reward. Third, we demonstrate that indulgence is intentional but
does not have to be premeditated—a temptation could cue a
justification and as long as the justification is accessible,
consumers may give in and indulge. Finally, we show that it is
not always acts of commission (e.g., volunteering, going to the
gym) that engender indulgence; it could also be acts of
omission, as long as they contribute to goal pursuit. The
salience of prior shopping restraint operates as a trigger that
consumers use to sanction themselves to indulge.
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Overview and design
The goal of this experiment was to demonstrate the self-
reward phenomenon in the purchasing context where consumers
give in vs. refrain from buying at time 1 (manipulated) and are
then faced with the possibility of buying an indulgent or
functional product. This experiment was a 2 (Decision at T1:
Buy vs. Not buy)×2 (Salience of T1 decision: Baseline vs.
Heightened)×2 (Nature of product at T2: Indulgent vs. Non-
indulgent) between-subjects design with random assignment.
Our justification hypothesis predicts purchase of an indulgent
product at time 2 is likely to be greater when the time 1 decision
was to not buy vs. to buy, but only when the time 1 decision is
salient. Justification is not easy when the time 1 decision is not
salient (and is therefore not accessible); hence, in this case,
purchase of a indulgent product at time 2 should not differ based
on time 1 decision (buy vs. no buy). Purchase of a non-indulgent
product should not be affected by time 1 buying decision
because additional justification is not needed in this case.
Pretest—stimulus development
We first identified and created attractive offers on products
that are either indulgent or non-indulgent, within each of two
product categories, books and software. Three hundred and
twenty-four students at a large Northeastern university rated
several different offers on various types of books and
software packages on their overall attractiveness, how
valuable the product was in the short- and the long-term,
whether using the product was prudent and far-sighted or self-
indulgent and near-sighted, and on the extent to which the
product satisfied the goals of education and entertainment (all
on 7-point scales). Eight distinct offer packages were selected
for use in this experiment, based on three criteria. First, all
selected offers were rated equally attractive (but not extremely
attractive, M=4.26, as that might render the purchase decision
trivial). Second, within a category, all offers were equated on
price, with price points chosen within the discretionary budget
of the student sample ($55 discounted down to $29.95 for
books and $45 discounted down to $19.95 for software).
Third, those products that were seen as more valuable in the
long than in the short run (average long- vs. short-term value
within books Ms=4.85 vs. 4.41, F(1, 323)=15.07, pb .001;
Ms=5.05 vs. 4.63, F(1, 323)=9.39, pb .01 within software)
were selected as non-indulgent products. Correspondingly,
those products that were seen as more valuable in the short-
than in the long-term (average short- vs. long-term value
within books Ms=3.71 vs. 2.99, F(1, 323)=28.29, pb .001;
Ms = 3.67 vs. 2.88, F(1, 323) = 20.05, pb .001 within
software)1 were selected as indulgent products. We also1 Note that participants in this experiment chose between two indulgent
products or two non-indulgent products as explained later, and not between an
indulgent and a non-indulgent product. Hence, it was important to keep the
relative long vs. short term value equation within indulgent and non-indulgent
products rather than across indulgent and non-indulgent products.ensured that non-indulgent [indulgent] products were seen as
more [less] prudent than indulgent and satisfied the goal of
education more [less] than they did entertainment. The non-
indulgent products selected were: (1) science and business
books, (2) biographies and math books, (3) foreign language
tutoring software, and (4) computer language tutoring
software. The indulgent products were: (1) comic books and
celebrity biographies, (2) pulp fiction bestsellers, (3) video
game software, and (4) personal hobby software.
Method
Three hundred and thirty-three students were recruited at a
large Northeastern university by means of flyers put up around
campus. On arrival at the experimental venue, they were
presented with a packet of ostensibly unrelated studies. The
experiment was presented as two scenarios (described below)
separated by an unrelated filler task. The first scenario
manipulated the T1 decision, while the second presented the
T2 decision and key dependent variables. Participants were
directed to individual workstations where they responded to the
stimuli at their own pace. Upon completion, they were paid,
thanked, and debriefed.
All respondents were presented with an impulse buying
scenario wherein they came across an attractive sale on books
(the indulgent books) as they were killing time in a mall, waiting
for a friend. In order to disguise the task, allow for heterogeneity
in preferences, and guard against the lone alternative bias, the
temptation was presented as a choice between two equally
attractive offers as pre-tested. After being shown the scenario
and product descriptions, respondents were told that they had
either bought or not bought the books at this sale. This
procedure randomly assigned the decision at T1 as part of the
experimental set-up (Arkes, Kung, & Hutzel, 2002), thereby
avoiding self-selection. Then, to better approximate the decision
process, respondents were asked to generate reasons supporting
their “decision” in as much detail as possible. In sum, the
forcing of the T1 decision followed by the thought generation
process aimed to experimentally simulate an actual purchase
decision (Robinson & Clore, 2001).
A filler task lasting approximately 15 min followed the
simulation of the T1 decision. Respondents in the baseline
salience condition were then presented with the T2 scenario and
purchase opportunity (product category: software). In order to
maintain relational bracketing (Read et al., 1999), the T2
scenario was set at the same mall the following weekend, where
participants had ostensibly gone for a movie. Half the
participants chose between two indulgent software products
and the other half chose between two non-indulgent software
products. They were also given the option of passing on both. In
the heightened salience condition, following the filler, respon-
dents were reminded of the T1 decision and asked to recall it in
as much detail as possible. The T2 software purchase decision
was presented immediately after this task.
The principal dependent variables in the experiment were the
proportion deciding to buy at T2 and the propensity to buy at T2
measured on a 100-point allocation task. Participants were then
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Fig. 2. Experiment 1: proportions choosing to buy at time 2.
2 It is also possible to test this effect by comparing the proportion buying
indulgent products under heightened accessibility of a T1 no buy decision
(63%) against the proportion buying indulgent products under baseline
accessibility of T1 no buy (29%) and T1 buy (37%) pooled. This contrast is
also significant (t(78) = 3.28, p b .01).
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participants in a previous experiment, and asked to indicate
which of these reflected thoughts that they had. The items either
opposed or supported buying (e.g., “I have already spent some
money that I hadn't planned on spending,” and, “I have already
spent some money, so—what the hell, I can spend some more!”)
and were presented in random order. Participants were free to
check as many as they wished, without any constraints.
Results and discussion
Hypothesis test
We predict that under heightened salience of the decision
made at T1, purchase of indulgent products at T2 should be
greater when the T1 decision was a salient not-buy vs. buy.
Moreover, the T1 decision should not have an effect on
purchase of indulgent products at T2 when it is not salient (i.e.,
at baseline salience). Purchase of non-indulgent products at T2
should not be affected by the T1 decision or by its salience
because these purchases do not need additional justification. To
test these predictions, we first conducted a binary logistic
regression on the decision to buy at T2, with the decision at T1
(buy vs. no buy), the salience of the T1 decision (baseline vs.
heightened), and the nature of the T2 product (indulgent vs.
non-indulgent) as independent variables. Supporting the greater
justifiability of non-indulgent (vs. indulgent products), there
was a significant main effect for the nature of product at T2,
such that overall non-indulgent products were more likely to be
bought at T2 than indulgent products (Ms=51.2% vs. 40.1%,Wald (1)=4.23, pb .05). Significant interactions between T2
product and T1 decision (Wald (1)=6.76, pb .01), and T2
product and salience of T1 decision (Wald (1)=6.45, pb .01)
were qualified by a significant three-way interaction (Wald
(1)=4.40, pb .05; see Fig. 2). Based on the three-way
interaction, analyses were conducted separately within the
heightened and baseline salience conditions. In support of our
hypothesis, under heightened salience of time 1 decision,
when faced with indulgent products, the proportion choosing
to buy at time 2 was greater if they had refrained from buying
at T1 than if they had previously bought at T1 (Ms=63% vs.
30%, t(78)=3.20, pb .01). At heightened salience, proportion
choosing to buy non-indulgent products at time 2 did not
differ based on time 1 decision to not buy vs. buy (Ms=41%
vs. 54%, t(82)=1.19, pN .24, ns). This supports the main
hypothesis regarding self-reward with indulgent products
when past restraint is salient. A different pattern was observed
at baseline salience. Here, proportions choosing to buy at time
2 did not differ whether the T1 decision had been to buy or
not buy, and this was regardless of whether the T2 products
were non-indulgent (Ms=37% vs. 29%, t(78) b1, pN .40, ns)
or indulgent (Ms=60% vs. 51%, t(78) b1, pN .40, ns).
Further, comparing across the heightened and baseline T1 no-
buy conditions, purchase of indulgent products in the
heightened condition was greater than in the baseline
condition (Ms=63% vs. 29%; t(78)=3.28, pb .01). This
supports our proposition that the effect is driven by an
increase in self-reward when justification is accessible
compared to default levels of purchase of indulgences.2
The second dependent measure was the propensity to buy
at T2, as measured by the points allocated out of 100. A 2
(T1 decision: Buy vs. Not buy)×2 (Salience of T1 decision:
Baseline vs. Heightened)×2 (Nature of T2 product: Indulgent
vs. Non-indulgent) between-subjects ANOVA conducted on
the propensity to buy revealed a significant effect of the
nature of T2 product such that overall, non-indulgent (vs.
indulgent) products were more likely to be bought at T2
(Ms=53.06 vs. 45.69, F(1, 324)=4.00, pb .05). This main
effect again suggests that in general, purchases of non-
indulgent products are easier to justify than those of indulgent
products. This was qualified by an interaction with the
salience of the T1 decision (F(1, 324)=4.45, pb .05) and a
three-way interaction (F(1, 324)=5.28, pb .05). Follow-up
contrasts again revealed that under heightened salience and
when faced with indulgent products, propensity to buy was
greater for those who had not bought at T1 than for those
who had bought (Ms=57.10 vs. 38.78, F(1, 324)=6.11,
pb .05). The propensity to buy non-indulgent products at T2
did not differ based on T1 decision to buy vs. not buy, even when
this decision was salient (Ms=51.98 vs. 43.09, F(1, 324)=1.49,
pN .20, ns). Further, at baseline salience, regardless of T2
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those who had bought at T1 (M=51.37) and those who had not
bought (M=50.66, Fb1). Again, comparing across the
heightened and baseline T1 no-buy conditions, purchase of
indulgent products in the heightened condition was greater than
in the baseline condition (Ms=57.10 vs. 41.42; F(1, 324)=4.31,
pb .05).
Process measures
Recall that participants had indicated which of twenty reason
items reflected their thoughts while they were making their T2
decision. An index of justifiability of buying at T2 was
constructed by subtracting the number of reasons opposing
buying from the number of reasons supporting buying. Our
hypothesis states that restraint, as opposed to indulgence, at time
1 should lead to a greater justifiability of buying indulgent
products at time 2. To trace this proposed process, we
investigated whether the justifiability of buying, as measured
by this constructed index, mediated the effect of T1 decision on
the propensity to buy at T2. Hence, we conducted a four-step
mediation analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986) within the high
salience, T2 indulgent products conditions, with T1 decision as
the independent variable, justifiability as the mediator, and
propensity to buy as the dependent variable. First, T1 decision
had a significant effect on propensity to buy (B=−18.32, t(80)=
−2.49, pb .05). Next, T1 decision had a significant effect on
justifiability of buying at T2 (B=−1.84, t(81)=−2.63, pb .01).
Third, justifiability had a significant effect on propensity to buy
(B=6.93, t(80)=7.73, pb .001). And finally, when justifiability
and T1 decision were simultaneously entered in a regression
predicting propensity to buy, the effect of justifiability remained
significant (B=6.65, t(79)=7.16, pb .001) while T1 decision
dropped below significance (B=−6.97, t(79)=−1.17, pb .25,
ns). A Sobel test supported the mediation effect (z=2.49,
pb .05; Sobel, 1982). This finding demonstrates that the
positivity in reasons supporting buying at T2 fully mediates
the effect of the decision at T1 on the propensity to buy at T2.
The decision at T1 affects the justifiability of buying at T2 and
the decision at T2, but once the reasons are accounted for there is
no effect of T1 on T2. Further, a similar analysis on the other
experimental conditions revealed that T1 decision did not have a
significant effect on the justifiability of buying at T2 (B=− .91,
t(324)=−1.27, pN .20, ns), which is further evidence that
salience of prior restraint is necessary for self-reward. More-
over, it is important to note that the measures of the propensity
to buy at T2 and the justifiability of buying at T2 were not
similar—propensity to buy was constructed by adding the
points allocated to buying the two different offers, while the
metric of justifiability was constructed by counting the number
of reason items checked freely. This argues against demand or
response consistency explanations for the observed mediation.
More specific evidence for the underlying role of justifica-
tion in explaining the observed patterns can be obtained by
examining responses to the specific reasons items. Each item
was cross-tabulated individually against the three independent
variables, T1 decision, salience, and T2 product. The only item
to vary significantly across salience treatments was Item #15, “Ihad refrained from buying the books, so I deserve a little treat”.
Consistent with our hypothesis, respondents who saw indulgent
products at T2 under heightened salience of T1 were
significantly more likely to check agreement with this item
than those who were at baseline salience (Ms=29% vs. 11%,
t(78)=2.11, pb .05).
These results demonstrate that in general, choice proportions
for non-indulgent products are greater than for indulgent
products. However, increasing the salience of previous restraint
can significantly increase purchase likelihood for indulgences at
T2. We found that this may be due to increased justifiability, as
people who think about past restraint feel justified in buying
products that offer greater value in the short term. Accessible
reasons guide purchase decisions and mediate the effect of prior
restraint on the tendency to reward oneself with a product
offering short-term value. Taken together, these findings
provide strong evidence for the role of reasons in explaining
self-rewarding behaviors across tempting consumption oppor-
tunities—increasing the salience of prior restraint can increase
purchase probability for indulgences, because indulgences offer
immediate gratification and hence can function as “deserved
treats.”
Alternative explanations
This experiment is open to a few criticisms. First,
participants were assigned to time 1 buy vs. not-buy conditions.
While there is precedent for this manipulation in the literature
(Arkes et al., 2002), and every attempt was made to get
participants to simulate the time 1 decision, these effects need to
be replicated using an alternative manipulation. Second, one
could argue that participants held a lay belief that people reward
themselves after they have exercised restraint and hence were
simply providing this response. We believe it is unlikely that
participants in experiment 1 simply responded based on their
naïve beliefs for two reasons. First, at time 2, participants were
assigned to either choose between two indulgences or between
two non-indulgences. A single subject did not make a choice
between an indulgence and a non-indulgence. Hence, it is hard
to see how the results reveal enactment of a lay belief. Second,
the lay belief that consumers reward themselves after restraint
may exist, but it is not clear that it exists in the more
sophisticated form shown here—namely, salient prior restraint
not influencing purchase at time 2 if the items are not
indulgences. Also, the finding that salience matters indicates
that it is not simply an effect of trying to intuit the experimental
hypothesis and conform to it: as with much of the research in
goal-directed behavior, participants need to find themselves in
the particular motivational states for any expected results to
obtain. Finally, our finding that baseline expectation that virtues
are more likely to be purchased than vices provides confidence
in the validity of the results.
Experiment 2—direct trade-offs and self-reward
This experiment provides a second direct test of the self-
reward hypothesis by asking respondents to directly indicate
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and a non-indulgence (e.g., a fruit salad; Sengupta & Zhou,
2007; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). By requiring respondents to
directly trade-off between an indulgence and a non-indulgence,
this procedure involves a conservative test of our theory
because a direct comparison makes it harder to justify the
indulgence (Okada, 2005). Moreover, to further increase
confidence in our findings, experiment 2 also uses a different
operationalization of the independent variable, and it explores
the underlying process in a consumption (as opposed to
purchase) setting at T2.
Method
Stimuli and design
This experiment was a 2 (T1 Decision: Buy vs. Not buy)×2
(Salience of T1 decision: Heightened vs. Baseline) fully crossed
between-subjects design. As described above, the dependent
variable was relative preference at T2 between an indulgent and
a non-indulgent product. The T1 decision was manipulated by
asking respondents to recall an instance in the recent past where
they had seen a product on sale that they had not originally
intended to buy, but had been really tempted by, and had ended
up either buying or not buying (between-subjects). The salience
of this decision was manipulated by placing the T2 temptations
either immediately after the recall task at the beginning of the
session (heightened salience), or over half an hour later, after an
unrelated filler task (on financial decision-making).
Participants and procedure
One hundred respondents (fifty-five men and forty-five
women) were recruited at a large Northeastern university, in
return for $15 compensation. On arrival at the laboratory, they
were directed to individual workstations and given a packet
consisting of stimuli for a set of ostensibly unrelated studies.
Each workstation had on it two identical opaque cardboard
boxes, with “Do Not Touch” written on them. Participants
worked through the stimuli at their own pace. When they came
to the T2 task, the instructions required them to raise their
hands. At this point, the experimenter came to their desk and
opened the two boxes, revealing a chocolate cake and a fresh
fruit salad. Participants were asked to indicate which of the two
options they would prefer in a direct comparison (1 = definitely
prefer cake, 9 = definitely prefer fruit salad; reverse coded such
that greater numbers were consistent with self-reward). On
completion, they were debriefed, paid, and thanked.
Results
Preliminary analysis of the direct comparison preference
indicated that men were marginally more likely than women to
prefer cake over salad (Ms=4.71 vs. 3.78, F(1, 98)=2.89,
pb .09), hence gender was controlled for in subsequent
analyses. A 2 (T1 decision: Buy vs. Not buy)×2 (Salience of
T1 decision) between-subjects ANCOVA with the relative
preference for cake over fruit salad revealed a significant
interaction effect (F(1, 95)=4.32, pb .05). Consistent with ourself-reward hypothesis, planned contrasts revealed that when
the T1 decision was salient, those who had not bought at T1
tended to prefer cake over fruit salad more than those who had
bought (Ms=4.79 vs. 3.42, F(1, 95)=3.18, pb .05, one-tailed).
There was no significant difference in relative preference for
cake over fruit salad when the T1 decision was not salient
(Ms=4.03 vs. 4.92, F(1, 95)=1.35, pN .20).
These results support the proposed self-reward mechanism.
Faced with a trade-off between a real cake (an indulgence) and a
real fruit salad (a non-indulgence), respondents who had a
salient memory of having resisted temptation indicated a
preference for the cake over the salad, while those who did
not have this memory salient, did not show this effect. Note that
this effect was observed despite respondents having only
recalled an instance of past restraint, thereby implicating the
salience of restraint and arguing against any depletion-based
mechanism. In other words, while resource depletion brought
about by restraint could have the effect of increasing indulgence
(Vohs & Faber, 2007), our findings suggest that depletion is not
necessary for the effect to obtain. The fact that the results
replicate in a consumption context at T2 also helps rule out any
budget constraint explanations for the previous experiment.
Alternative explanation
While these findings could be interpreted as revealing
participants' lay theories of what they are expected to do when
they have shown restraint, this is unlikely for two reasons. First,
participants expected to consume their choice, hence they were
making real choices. Second, indulgence is chosen more than
non-indulgence only when it can be justified by accessible
reasons—this is consistent with the hypothesis. The justifica-
tion mechanism could be considered a lay theory reflective of
normative behavior or simply a mechanism that brings about the
behavior. Based on the reasons-based choice literature, we
believe it is the latter. To test this explanation, we conducted a
follow-up experiment, in which participants were presented the
same T1 scenario as in experiment 1, framed in the third person
(e.g., “Imagine a person X was in a mall…”, and X chose to
either buy or not buy the products on sale). Following the
scenario, participants were asked what X would choose, given a
choice between a chocolate cake and a fruit salad. Contrary to
the self-reward hypothesis, a majority of respondents indicated
that following an indulgent (vs. non-indulgent) decision at T1,
X would be more likely to choose the indulgent cake at T2
(MTIBuy=67.3% vs. MT1NotBuy=44.9%, χ
2(1)=5.01, pb .05).
This result, which is indicative of a highlighting effect (Dhar &
Simonson, 1999), argues against the above lay theory based
demand explanation. Indeed, it suggests that if respondents do
indeed hold lay theories about the type of situation we study
(which we believe they do), these lay theories tend to support
highlighting rather than self-reward.
So far, the justification that has instigated indulgence is
restraint at a previous impulse purchase opportunity. If our
theorizing is correct, then any justification afforded by a prior
purchase decision should have the same effect, as long as it





No donation to charity
T1 Buy T1 Not buy T1 Buy T1 Not buy
Preference for
cake vs. fruit salad
5.37b 4.16a 4.06a 6.18b
Choice of cake
over fruit salad
58.5%b 36.8%a 37.5%a 82.4%c
Note: T1 decision is salient in all conditions.
a,b,cMeans in the same row having different superscripts are significantly
different (one-tailed).
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varying the type of justification.
Experiment 3: self-reward for prior purchase
Our argument so far has been that salient prior restraint
enables indulgence by allowing people to justify their
indulgence based on past “good” behavior. If justification is
indeed the mechanism underlying indulgence, then salient prior
consumption should have the same effect as salient prior
restraint, if salient prior consumption can be made to provide a
justification for indulgence. Further, if prior restraint is reframed
so that it does not afford the justification to indulge, then prior
indulgence should lead to greater indulgence at T2. Such a
demonstration would pin down the role of justification in
instigating indulgence. In this experiment, we designed a
condition where prior purchase is viewed positively and affords
justification for current indulgence whereas prior restraint is
viewed ambivalently and affords less justification. To facilitate
justification based on prior impulse purchase, we told
participants that purchase proceeds from their T1 purchase/
non-purchase were given to charity. As shown in prior research
(e.g., Khan & Dhar, 2006), acts of altruism facilitate indulgence;
hence, we expect greater indulgence at T2 under T1 buy vs. no-
buy conditions (where not buying is now not necessarily “good”
behavior). In conditions where this altruism justification for
prior purchase is not given, we should replicate greater
indulgence under T1 no-buy (vs. buy) conditions.
Method
Stimuli and design
This experiment was in the form of a 2 (T1 Decision: Buy vs.
Not buy)×2 (T1 Donation: Proceeds donated to charity vs. No
donation) fully crossed between-subjects design. The T1
purchase decision was observed by giving participants the
opportunity to spend some of their experiment compensation
money to buy a bar of chocolate described as being “organic
European chocolate that is new to the market.” The donation to
charity was then manipulated by telling respondents that the
collections received from sale of the chocolate would be
donated to charity, or by not mentioning any donation. The T2
self-reward opportunity was then immediately presented as a
choice between chocolate cake and fruit salad, depicted using
color photographs (as in Sengupta & Zhou, 2007). We
hypothesized that while the basic self-reward effect would be
replicated in the no-charity condition (time 1 decision is always
salient in this experiment), it would be reversed in the charity
condition. This is because the donation would allow respon-
dents who had given in to temptation and bought the chocolate
to justify treating themselves, while those who did not buy
would not have this justification.
Participants and procedure
One hundred and one respondents (52% female) partici-
pated in this experiment. On arrival, they were directed to
individual workstations and given a set of questionnairesincluding some unrelated stimuli and the materials for this
experiment at the end. The T1 temptation consisted of a
single sheet describing the European chocolate, followed by
a tear-away coupon where participants were to indicate
whether they would like to use part of their experiment
compensation to buy some chocolate or not. Immediately
following this was the T2 measure consisting of photographs
of a cake and a fruit salad followed by the same dependent
variables as in study 2. Finally, participants were debriefed
and thanked.
Results and discussion
Eight respondents said they were extremely frequent dieters
(circling 7 on the 7-point scale), and hence were excluded from
the data set prior to analyses. The data patterns remained
substantively unaffected by this measure. 39% of participants
chose to buy at the time 1 chocolate buying opportunity (and
this did not vary by gender, χ2(1)= .03, NS). Further, although
the time 1 decision was measured rather than manipulated, our
hypothesis predicts an interaction between time 1 buying
decision and donation to charity; this precludes a self-selection
explanation for the results. A 2 (T1 Decision)×2 (Donation)
between-subjects ANOVA, using the rated preference for cake
vs. salad at T2 as the dependent variable, revealed no main
effect, but a significant interaction (F(1, 89)=8.13, pb .05; see
Table 1). Follow-up contrasts revealed, as expected, in the
no-donation condition, respondents preferred cake more
when they had not bought the chocolates than when they
had bought (Ms=5.37 vs. 4.16, F(1, 89)=2.77, pb .10),
replicating the basic self-reward effect. However, there was a
reversal in the donation condition, with respondents preferring
cake less when they had not bought vs. bought (Ms=4.06 vs.
6.18, F(1, 89)=5.38, pb .05). This pattern was reflected on the
choice measure. With no donation, those who had restrained at
T1 were directionally more likely to choose cake over fruit
salad (Ms=58.5% vs. 36.8%, t(45)=1.50, pb .07, one-tailed).
This was reversed in the donation condition where respondents
who had restrained at T1 were less likely to choose cake than
those who had given in (Ms=37.5% vs. 82.4%, t(39)=3.60,
pb .001).
These results provide strong support for our proposed
justification mechanism. Further, they also suggest that it is







T1 Buy T1 Not buy T1 Buy T1 Not buy
Choice of cake
over fruit salad
19.1%a 38.0%b 26.1%a,b 39.6%b
Self-esteem 3.49a 3.54a 3.63a 3.65a
Note: T1 decision is salient in all conditions.
a,bMeans in the same row having different superscripts are significantly
different.
342 A. Mukhopadhyay, G.V. Johar / Journal of Consumer Psychology 19 (2009) 334–345indulgence; it is the justification afforded by that act. The
specific pattern of results suggests that prior impulse
purchase behavior, whether it is to buy or not to buy, can
be used to justify indulgence as long as the prior behavior is
virtuous (e.g., altruistic—proceeds of purchase were donated
to charity, or normative—did not buy on impulse). The
justification in this case is not prior effort as in Kivetz and
Simonson (2002), but prior decision, and the implications of
that decision. Increased indulgence in both prior buy as well
as in prior no-buy conditions suggests that effort or resource
depletion do not underlie these results because purchase and
restraint cannot both be viewed as depleting or effortful. If
simply making a decision was effortful, then results should
have been consistent with Dholakia et al. (2005) and
revealed high levels of indulgence in all conditions.
So far, the results suggest that shopping restraint can serve as
a justification for subsequent indulgence as long as the restraint
is salient. An independent mechanism by which shopping
restraint can increase indulgence is by increasing self-esteem, or
as Khan and Dhar (2006) put it, “boosting the self-concept.”
Khan and Dhar (2006) have argued that altruistic acts liberate
people to behave indulgently. Next, we turn to this alternate
explanation for our results.
Experiment 4: self-concept boost is sufficient but not
necessary for self-reward
This experiment examines the roles of the restraint-induced
justification mechanism vs. the restraint-induced self-esteem
enhancement mechanism in instigating indulgence. As
described in Fig. 1, we do not believe that these two accounts
contradict each other, but rather that self-reward is multiply
determined. If this is indeed the case, then we should observe
self-reward even when self-esteem is not implicated. In this
experiment, we manipulate whether participants are reminded
of their self-esteem either before the T2 decision, or after it. The
condition where self-esteem is measured after T2 is analogous
to the baseline conditions in the previous three experiments,
where we expect to see the standard justification-based self-
reward effect. Measuring self-esteem immediately after the T1
decision enables us to observe whether self-esteem is enhanced




This experiment was in the form of a 2 (T1 Decision: Buy vs.
Not buy)×2 (Self-esteem measurement: Before T2 vs. After T2)
fully crossed between-subjects design. The T1 purchase
decision was simulated as in experiment 2 where participants
were asked to recall a prior episode of giving in vs. holding back
from an impulse purchase. Following this, half the participants
responded to the State Self-Esteem Scale (a 20-item measure of
self-esteem; Heatherton & Polivy 1991). All participants were
then presented the T2 self-reward opportunity, again a choice
between chocolate cake and fruit salad, depicted using colorphotographs (as in Sengupta & Zhou, 2007). Finally, those
participants in the self-esteem measurement after T2 condition
responded to the same measure of self-esteem.
Participants and procedure
One hundred and ninety-one respondents (56% female)
participated in this experiment. On arrival at the laboratory, they
were directed to individual workstations and given a set of
questionnaires which included some unrelated stimuli. The T1
and T2 stimuli were presented as separate studies on separate
sheets of paper. After completion, participants were debriefed
and thanked.
Results and discussion
The proportion of respondents opting to self-reward at T2 by
choosing the cake over the fruit salad was cross-tabulated
against the two independent variables. The basic self-reward
effect was replicated in the condition where self-esteem was
measured after T2, with participants who had not bought at T1
being more likely to choose cake over fruit salad than those who
had bought at T1 (Ms=38.0% vs. 19.1%, χ2(1)=4.19, pb .05).
However, when self-esteem was measured before the T2
decision, there was no difference between those who had not
bought vs. those who had bought at T1 (Ms=39.6% vs. 26.1%,
χ2(1)=1.94, pN .15; see Table 2). Analysis of the self-esteem
revealed no significant effects; all respondents reported
uniformly high self-esteem (M=3.58 on a 5-point scale).
Hence, the no-buy decision did not boost self-esteem in this
case (ceiling effects may be possible in this high self-esteem
population); however, being reminded of their (high) self-
esteem led to generally increased indulgence.
These results demonstrate strong support for our proposed
justification mechanism. When presented an opportunity to
indulge after a prior occasion of indulgence or restraint, we find
that not buying at T1 leads to greater indulgence. Further,
simply recalling the act of restraining or giving in at T1 does not
influence self-esteem. However, when respondents are
reminded of their generally high self-esteem, even those who
bought at T1 tend to become more indulgent. This supports the
self-esteem route to indulgence proposed by Khan and Dhar
(2006). However, when participants are not reminded of their
high self-esteem, those who had not bought at T1 tend to
indulge more than those who had bought at T1. Given that self-
esteem is the same across conditions, the only explanation for
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indulgence.
General discussion
The studies described above demonstrate that when
restraint at a prior impulse buying opportunity is salient,
consumers tend to reward themselves with the purchase or
consumption of an indulgent product, namely, one that offers
gratification in the short term. Experiment 1 demonstrated this
basic effect in a purchasing context at both time 1 and time 2,
and showed that the effect was mediated by the justifiability
of buying at time 2. The cognitive process was further
identified using respondents' agreement with plausible
reasons for their behavior—the only reason item that varied
significantly across conditions was the one that reflected self-
reward justification. Experiment 2 replicated the result using a
direct trade-off between an indulgent vs. non-indulgent
product to be consumed as opposed to purchased at time 2,
and demonstrated that liking for the products in question
varied systematically as per the predictions of our cognitive
model. Experiment 3 pinned down the justification process by
showing that any “good” behavior can be used to justify
indulgence, even if it is prior impulse purchase where
purchase proceeds are given to charity. In this case, prior
impulse purchase can be encoded positively and used to
justify indulgence whereas prior restraint has ambiguous
implications and is therefore harder to use as justification.
One may argue that the lack of a significant self-reward
phenomenon in the low salience of prior restraint conditions
of experiments 1 and 2 argue against a self-concept boost
mechanism for the finding because self-concept boost should
be relatively long lasting (at least as long as the experimental
session). However, this is only indirect evidence and it could
simply be that self-concept is not spontaneously activated
upon restraint in this situation. Finally, experiment 4 pinned
down the extent to which it was necessary to implicate the
self in order to justify indulgence and showed that either a
self-concept boost or a prior “good” behavior that did not
directly implicate the self-concept could be used as justifica-
tion for indulgence. A boost in self-concept is not a necessary
condition to facilitate indulgence.
Contributions
These findings provide insight into one possible mechanism
underlying behaviors that could be labeled as failures in self-
regulation. Much of the self-control literature characterizes self-
control as a conflict between a relatively automatic force of
desire that spurs the consumer towards indulgence and a more
conscious, controlled force of willpower that restricts this
consumption (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991; Shiv & Fedorikhin,
1999; see also Baumeister et al. 2008). This literature often
infers lapses of self-control from observed choices of indulgent
products. However, it is not as if indulgence exclusively
happens when impulsive consumers act in the spur of the
moment. Our results show that under certain circumstances,endogenous to a sequence of consumption decisions, consumers
may strategically (even if without complete awareness) choose
to indulge themselves. Such behavior signals, if anything, an
episode of successful self-regulation.
Prior literature has established the importance of justification
on choice, and this research goes a step further by showing that
justification is stimulated by a virtuous choice at T1 on an
indulgent choice at T2. It also goes beyond this literature by
focusing on determinants of indulgent choices. One process that
has received some attention is that of ego depletion (Muraven &
Baumeister, 2000), whereby an initial act of self-regulation
depletes regulatory resources, thereby impairing subsequent
self-regulation. Ego depletion cannot account for the current
results, especially since the initial act of restraint was
manipulated in three experiments by asking participants to
recall an occasion when they had or had not given in to an
impulse purchase opportunity. The ego depletion account does
not propose that the act of recalling is itself depleting, and our
participants did not find it difficult to recall these episodes,
describing them in rich detail regardless of whether they had
given in or held back.
Kivetz and Zheng (2006) implicate two types of justification
underlying indulgence—entitlement (through hard work) or
non-depletion of income, and speculate that alternative
explanations for self-gratification such as ego depletion operate
via a justification mechanism. Our results add to this by
highlighting another justification for indulgence, namely prior
restraint. Further, we isolate two possible justification mechan-
isms, one that boosts the self-concept, and another that operates
independent of self-concept. The entitlement route may
similarly operate without implicating the self, but by simply
providing a temporary justification for ephemeral indulgence.
Indeed, while we limited the scope of our research to shopping
restraint at time 1, it is highly plausible that our model can be
applied to virtuous choices in general.
Dhar and Simonson (1999) showed that when consumers
make trade-offs between two different goals within a consump-
tion episode, they tend to “balance” choices by furthering first
one goal and then the other. Our research may be interpreted as a
demonstration of meta-preferences for such balancing beha-
viors. However, not only is our context not interpretable as
“goals” and “resources”, as Dhar and Simonson's framework
requires, but we believe our findings extend theirs in several key
ways. First, we find our effects across temporally separated
decisions, demonstrating that balancing need not be restricted
within a single consumption episode. Second, we demonstrate
self-reward across various different consumption categories,
thereby generalizing Dhar and Simonson's findings to the very
broadly defined goals of “pleasure” and “not spending”. Finally
and most importantly, we go beyond Dhar and Simonson by
demonstrating a process-level explanation of our effects,
namely, justification-based choice.
Future research
One question raised by our findings concerns the specific
justification afforded by prior restraint. Our results do not speak
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justify future indulgence. We believe that impulse purchase
opportunities operate as temptations that distract consumers
who do not have the goal of shopping for those product
categories at that point in time. In this case, the nature of the
product should not matter because giving in to the temptation
and buying something, whether an indulgent or non-indulgent
product, cannot provide justification for future indulgence.
However, holding back from any type of product is an act that is
encoded as goal-consistent and therefore “good” behavior; this
behavior can then be used to justify subsequent indulgence. It is
possible that restraining from giving in to a vice-type product
provides even more justification than restraining from a virtue-
type product. Data from an additional experiment not reported
here suggest that the nature of the product refrained from at T1
does not differentially influence the propensity to self-reward;
however, examining the continuum of justification is an area for
future research.
It would also be interesting to consider when restraint from
impulse shopping leads to consistency, rather than self-reward.
This might be the case when the two episodes are not bracketed,
there exists a strong norm to be virtuous at T2, the behavior is
habitual (Ji & Wood, 2007), the two episodes are construed at
the same high level (Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007), or
there is a strongly chronic trait such as prudence (Mukhopad-
hyay et al., 2008). Further, we did not empirically investigate
the possible role of affect. Mukhopadhyay and Johar (2007) and
Ramanathan and Williams (2007) both demonstrate that
resisting temptations causes self-conscious emotions such as
pride, and Mick and Faure (1998) demonstrated that pride and
deservingness mediated the effects of achievement and attribu-
tions on self-gifting. Hence, it is plausible that feelings such as
pride may indeed spur one to self-reward. However, it should be
noted that self-conscious emotions tend to be cognitively based,
and hence may be subsumed in the process we propose.
Implications
Our results have important implications for practitioners.
From a marketer's viewpoint, while there is abundant literature
on the quantitative effects of promotions, there is less
knowledge about qualitative aspects such as the effects of
promoting different types of products. This research addresses
the gap by deriving clear implications for positioning decisions
and the sequencing of offers. Sales managers, salespeople, and
CRM database managers who track consumer decisions over
time can benefit from knowing how being exposed to tempting
offers once can affect responses to subsequent purchase
opportunities. For instance, based on our findings, managers
would be advised to sequence offers such that indulgences are
offered following a no-buy decision. Our research also
suggests that no-buy decisions should be followed up by
offers that promote the indulgence value of a given product.
After a no-buy decision, managers would be advised to
position an indulgent product by making the customer think
about their previous restraint, thereby bracketing the two
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